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rAbstract
Our study is one of the first to take search friction and cross-firm differences in factor
productivity into account when investigating firm behavior towards second-generation
immigrants in Denmark. We ensure sub-sample homogeneity in search models by
matching second-generation immigrants to their ethnic Danish twins according to
parental characteristics and informal network quality. We find that second-generation
immigrants with a high-school or primary school education, in particular females,
perform as well or better than their ethnic counterparts. Second generation immigrants
with vocational education, in particular males, face lower arrival rates when unemployed
and higher layoff rates than those of their twins.
JEL classification: J15, J61, J71
Keywords: Firm behavior; Equilibrium search model; Matching; Second-generation
immigrants1 Introduction
A widely discussed issue in the literature on labor market integration is whether or not
firms behave differently toward second-generation immigrants1 than toward ethnic
natives entering the labor market in European countries, given that second-generation
immigrants are observed to have limited success in the labor market compared to eth-
nic natives in such countries. If differential behavior on the part of firms exists, it could
potentially have a lasting economic impact on second-generation immigrants in terms
of future wage growth and career prospects.
Differential behavior toward second-generation immigrants could potentially operate
at various stages: in the pre-labor market, in the competition for an apprenticeship,
during labor market entry, in wages paid for equivalent work, with opportunities for
training, and in terms of involuntary separations.
In the traditional wage equation-based analysis of differential behavior toward minor-
ity groups, key labor market factors, such as the job-offer arrival rate and the layoff
rate, are often not taken into account. Incorporating these explanations is difficult
without a model of how each may contribute to the wage densities of individuals.
Search models are particularly well suited for this task since they are easily adapted to
include many of the behavioral features of interest here. According to search theory,
wage dispersion is largely a consequence of search friction and cross-firm differences
in productivity. It is possible that the job-finding rate and the job-retention rate are2014 Datta Gupta and Kromann; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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two groups search through different channels, their networks differ in quality, they do
not receive the same number of offers or they experience different layoff rates.
By estimating our models separately for matched samples of ethnic natives and
second-generation immigrants, we gain new insight into whether observationally
equivalent ethnic Danes and second-generation immigrants entering the labor market
for the first time face differing labor market prospects.2 Estimating equilibrium search
models (ESMs) requires a rich longitudinal data set, including information about an
individual’s labor market history on a weekly or monthly basis. In contrast to many
studies, we use register data containing the labor market histories of the population of
immigrants in Denmark, which allows us to observe and estimate models for both
second-generation immigrants and comparable ethnic Danes.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews the two strands in the migration
literature. Section 3 looks at the theoretical and empirical search models. Section 4
introduces individual-level panel data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the
estimation results and Section 6 presents the conclusions.2 Previous literature
The emergence of the second (in some cases higher) generation of immigrants3 has led
to a growing literature on the school-to-work transition and early labor market per-
formance of these cohorts. We draw on two strands of literature in this area.2.1 Existing literature on labor market performance on second & higher generation
immigrants
Evidence from the ‘old’ immigrant-receiving countries (e.g. US, Canada, the UK, and
Australia) in which the full age range of second-generation immigrants is observed
shows that the second-generation overall appear to be doing almost as well in the labor
market as their ethnic native counterparts (see e.g. Card (2005), Aydemir and Sweetman
(2007), Miller and Chiswick (2007), Dustman et al. (2004)). In part this is due to the rela-
tively high level of education of second-generation immigrants compared to ethnic natives
in these countries (i.e. positive selection), with the exception of certain ethnic groups.
In continental Europe earlier generations of relatively educated guest workers and
immigrants from other European countries are being replaced by refugees and asylum-
seekers, who tend to have lower educational attainment and employability. Not surpris-
ingly, the evidence from these settings shows second generation immigrants lagging
substantially behind their ethnic native counterparts in terms of educational achieve-
ment and, in particular, labor force participation, success in finding a job and wages
(Nielsen et al. (2003), Rooth and Eckberg (2003)).
A number of studies find that parental capital and family background are important
for educational attainment and achievement of the second-generation immigrants
(Ammermüller (2007), Rangvid (2007)) and even more so for their waiting time until
the first job and the duration of their first job spell. Besides parental capital, the ethnic
concentration in a neighborhood matters for immigrant integration. As extensively
discussed in the classic papers by Chiswick and Miller (2005) and Borjas (1995), ethnic
neighborhood concentration reduces immigrants’ host country language skills, and
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independent negative effects on earnings. Enclaves could have positive effects, however,
in terms of lowering the costs of ‘ethnic goods’ and serving as important information
networks.
In an attempt to take such differences into account Behrenz et al. (2007) construct
matched comparison samples of ethnic natives and second-generation immigrants ac-
cording to parents’ socioeconomic background, age, occupational status, and county of
residence. Results from probit employment models show that second-generation immi-
grant males and females face at least a 10 percentage point lower probability of having
a job than do similar ethnic natives even after matching. The fact that native–second
generation immigrant differences persist in Scandinavian countries even after taking
parental and neighborhood networks into account have led some researchers to point
instead to demand side factors and institutional explanations.2.2 Existing literature on demand-side and institutional explanations
This literature includes economic models of ethnic discrimination in the labor market
(see Becker (1957)) arising from either employer prejudice against workers of foreign
descent or from employee unwillingness to work alongside coworkers of foreign origin.
In a different view, the statistical discrimination or screening model (see e.g. Arrow
(1972) and Phelps (1972)) explains the existence of labor market discrimination against
ethnic minorities as cost-saving behavior on the part of employers, who use ethnicity as
an effective sorting device when determining the (unknown) productive abilities of
workers. The implication of both models is that individuals of foreign descent will be
discriminated against in the labor market in terms of hiring, firing and remuneration.
These individuals may even be given less training if employers perceive them to be less
productive, which may reinforce statistical discrimination against them if, as a conse-
quence of obtaining less training, their productivity suffers (Coate and Loury (1993)).
Empirical investigations from different countries using different econometric models
have found that even after controlling for age, education and other background charac-
teristics, immigrants earn lower wages than ethnic natives (see e.g. Altonji and Blank
(1999)). These unexplained differences are commonly attributed to selective screening
by employers or discrimination.
In terms of institutions, a recent survey paper by Schröder (2010) focuses on the role
of recruitment channels and other labor market institutions. Most jobs vacancies are
filled through personal networks and informal recruitment channels, and there are dif-
ferences in both the size and quality of the networks of ethnic natives and immigrants.
Furthermore, institutions that pave the way from school to work, such as training or
apprenticeship slots can foster and prolong labor market disadvantage. Colding (2005)
finds a much higher dropout rate from vocational education in Denmark among chil-
dren of immigrants (60% compared to 30% among ethnic natives), which is presumably
due to the difficulties immigrant children face in finding an internship. Thus, if
employers perceive immigrant children as being harder to train or more risky to
employ in a setting where the wage for unskilled labor is given, this will result in
higher unemployment for immigrant children compared to ethnic natives, even if
their productivity is the same.
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and employer behavior, we describe below a methodological approach that can address
these behaviors in a common framework.2.3 The equilibrium search approach
Formally providing a structure for the workings of the demand side of the labor market
and its institutions is the focus of equilibrium search models (ESMs) of the labor market.
We know of only a few attempts to apply an ESM to ethnic native-immigrant wage
differentials and none to second generation immigrants. The most relevant are two
unpublished paper by Bartolucci (2008) and Bowlus et al. (2013) both analyzing first
generation immigrants. Bartolucci finds that immigrants are more productive than eth-
nic natives in similar jobs, are more mobile, but have lower bargaining power. Bowlus
et al. conclude that immigrants take on average 13 years to acquire the native search
parameters, using a version of the ESM used here allowing for different worker types in
the same labor market.3 The economic and empirical models
We start out briefly explaining the search model. We then discuss how the search
model can be applied to analyze issues such as the possible discrimination of second-
generation immigrants at the time of labor market entry.3.1 The equilibrium search model (ESM)
Job search theory extends neoclassical theory by incorporating the notion that workers
only have partial information about employment opportunities. Given this fact, em-
ployers have monopsony power in the sense that a higher wage relative to those offered
by competing employers will attract more workers giving employers an incentive to dif-
ferentiate wage policy, which implies wage dispersion. In the search model, differences
in firm behavior are possible because of the presence of search friction, and this can ex-
plain the persistence of differences even over time, in contrast to the wage equation ap-
proach (Mortensen (2003)).
The first attempt to use an ESM to interpret wage differentials was made by Bowlus
(1997). In her paper, Bowlus focused on the effect of gender differences in friction
patterns on wage differentials. We are similarly interested in applying the search
model to try to identify if and how labor market dynamics and friction explain ethnic
native–immigrant entry wage and early career differences in Denmark.4 We follow
Bowlus et al. (2001) and base our analysis on the Burdett-Mortensen ESM (Burdett
and Mortensen (1998)).
The Burdett-Mortensen general ESM characterizes the labor market as having two
states (employment and unemployment) with on- and off-the-job searches and a job
destruction process. Workers receive a wage offer while unemployed at rate λu > 0 and
employed at rate λe > 0. Jobs are destroyed at rate σ. It is assumed that there are a con-
tinua of F firms and L workers in the labor market analyzed. We assume that workers
base their decision to accept or decline employment solely on the basis of wage and
that the decision is independent of whether they are ethnic natives or second-
generation immigrants. Workers take the wage offer distribution of the firms as given
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reservation wage strategy. Following Mortensen and Neumann (1988), a worker’s reserva-
tion wage r while unemployed is
r ¼ bþ λu−λeð Þ
Zh
r
1−G xið Þð Þ
λe 1−G xið Þð Þ þ σ
 
dxi ð1Þ
showing that the optimal reservation wage depends on market opportunities as summa-
rized in the wage-offer distribution G(w), the transition rates and supply-side factors.
Lastly, h is the highest wage paid to the workers and b is unemployment benefit.5
Employers maximize profit by setting wages for the workers, taking reservation wages
and wage offer distributions as given. The wages are chosen given the wage posting of
the other firms and the search strategies of the workers. Profit maximization requires
that employers of the same type earn the same profit in equilibrium. Our approach is
to incorporate possible differential firm behavior by estimating structural parameters
separately for second-generation immigrants and ethnic Danes rather than by relaxing
the profit maximization condition. We allow firms to be heterogeneous in productivity
by assuming that there are Q types of firms with productivity P1 < P2 < P3 <… < PQ, i.e.
discrete heterogeneity.6 Each firm faces the following profit function:
π ¼ P−wð Þ ð2Þ
where prices have been normalized to one, the firm productivity is P and the wage for
the worker is w.
In equilibrium, each employer maximizes profit given the search strategies of the
workers and the wages offered by the other employers. At the same time, each worker
searches sequentially from the wage offer distribution using an expected wealth maxi-
mizing stopping strategy. The market wage offer distribution G(w) is thus determined
endogenously as an equilibrium outcome in this model (for details, see Bunzel et al.
(2001)). The explicit functional form of the cumulative density function (CDF) under
discrete firm heterogeneity results in
Gj wð Þ ¼ 1þ zeze þ
1þ ze 1−αj−1
 
ze
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Pj−w
Pj−rj
s !
for w ∈ rj; hj
 
; j ¼ 1; 2;…;Q where ze ¼ λe
σ
ð3Þ
where Pj is the productivity, αj is the fraction of firms with productivity Pj or less, rj isthe lowest wage offered by a firm of type j, and hj is the highest wage paid by these
firms. To estimate the model, we use the methodology developed by Bowlus et al.
(1995).
Overall, the ESMs are good for exploring wage variation, which is difficult to correl-
ate with observables. However, it is less well suited for understanding the effect of vari-
ables that correlate with wages. Thus, it is important to compare groups that are
similar in terms of wage-enhancing characteristics. Since the sample we examine only
contains young individuals, and we estimate the model separately for males and females
as well as for ethnic natives, Western, and non-Western second-generation immigrants,
and we divide the sample into three educational levels (high school, vocational school
and primary school), we believe that the subsamples are homogenous.7 For the ethnic
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istics matching second-generation immigrants.
After estimation, we compare estimates across subsamples. If all the parameters are
similar across two subsamples (i.e. natives and immigrants), then it is reasonable to as-
sume that all workers in the two subsamples are in the same market, behave similarly
and are treated equally. On the other hand, if some of the parameters are different
across two subsamples, then we technically assume that a separate market exists for
each of the two subgroups, and the homogenous search model applies to each market,
and the degree of search friction will influence the degree of wage dispersion. For ex-
ample, Nielsen et al. (2003) found significant differences in the job-finding rate and the
duration of the first employment spell between ethnic natives and second-generation
immigrants, differences that were partially explained by parental capital and neighbor-
hood effects. These differences in job arrival and separation across ethnic natives and
second-generation immigrants could reflect potential differences in firm behavior, and,
thus, cannot be handled in traditional human capital wage regressions. Although haz-
ard based transition reduced-form models also are able to estimate job and unemploy-
ment durations, they cannot simultaneously estimate the wage offer distribution. Thus,
the added value of the ESM approach is the joint modelling of the wage distribution
and the unemployment and job durations, including in particular that the job arrival
rate is conditional on wages, however, at the cost of assuming separate markets and
thus ruling out any spillovers and externalities between competing groups.3.2 The ESM and network contributions
Recent research has shown that an individual’s network contributes significantly to the
job search process. In particular, individuals’ successes or failures in the labor market
are, to a large extent, influenced by the characteristics of the social networks in the
local neighborhood. For example, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that indi-
viduals living close to a large number of employed neighbors are more likely to have
jobs than are individuals living in areas with fewer employed neighbors. Furthermore,
Arrow and Borzekowski (2004) show by way of simulations that differences in the
number of ties workers have with firms can lead to substantial inequality and explain
roughly 15% of the unexplained gap in wages and a substantial part of the disparity
between black and white incomes in the US.
Pinkster (2009) uses the ‘social isolation’ hypothesis according to which individuals
living in disadvantaged neighborhoods are cut off from good job opportunities primar-
ily because most of their contacts (their neighbors) are also out of work and, thereby,
unable to provide them with important information about jobs openings and em-
ployers. High employment among one’s neighbors, on the other hand, can increase the
chances of getting tips about openings, valuable information about employers and even
recommendations. Furthermore, neighbors could directly assist with writing job appli-
cations or share their experiences with certain employers.
We believe that different search patterns among our groups might be a problem. This
explanation has neither been captured in earlier wage regressions, employment regres-
sions nor in duration models and this would not be captured in the ESM we use. If it is
believed that second-generation immigrants behave differently in terms of the number
Datta Gupta and Kromann IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:16 Page 7 of 22
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/16of jobs applied for, how they write their applications or how they prepare for the job
interview, this difference will in the search model transform into differences in the ar-
rival rates of offers and give biased results. The solution is either to extend the existing
search model or use matching to ensure homogeneity. We follow the second approach.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining a direct measure of contacts, a key challenge in
the literature is how to construct a measure of an individual’s network. For our paper,
this problem is even more complicated as we want to use the network variables in a
matching analysis and, therefore, need to use variables that are comparable across eth-
nicity. We follow the previous literature and assume networks are geographic areas
(see e.g. Topa (2001)). The data includes information on the postal code area in which
the individual is residing. Based on this information, we construct a variable which we
call ‘postal code employment rate’ defined as the percentage of individuals employed in
the postal code area for each of 1,019 postal code areas. We thus follow Andersson
et al. (2009) and use small homogenous areas in terms of population characteristics,
economic status and living conditions, for making the assumption of conditional inde-
pendence of contacts more plausible. We expect that the ‘postal code employment rate’
captures the relevant network effect for finding jobs. We furthermore control for differ-
ences in labor market abilities through ten variables to proxy parental capital: four
dummy variables for the education level of each of the parents and two dummy vari-
ables indicating whether the father and mother, respectively, are employed.8
3.2.1 Matching
The goal of matching is to make the two groups, second-generation immigrants and
ethnic Danes, comparable in every way except for immigrant status. To do this we
ensure, as Behrenz et al. (2007) do that both groups have grown up under similar socio-
economic circumstances. Thus, we use matching to construct comparison samples of
ethnic Danes according to their parents’ socioeconomic background, employment sta-
tus and education. Furthermore, own age and gender are also used to match on to
properly compare entry into the labor market. For example, whether an individual en-
ters the labor market before or after 18 years of age will have a large impact on the
wage rate and, therefore, might also have an effect on the likelihood of finding
employment.
We find the ‘statistical ethnic Danish twins’ of second-generation immigrants among
the ethnic Dane population, with the same background who face similar labor markets,
by using propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Since the pool of
ethnic Danes consists of the whole population, it is possible to use nearest neighbor
without replacement as the matching method and get a good match. After matching,
we test whether the two groups are balanced with respect to the covariates using equal-
ity of means in the treated and non-treated groups, which is similar to the standardized
difference test used by, for example, Smith and Todd (2005).4 Data and summary statistics
We select individuals immediately after they attain their highest educational degree—
either primary school, high school, or vocational school—and follow them for two suc-
cessive spells to examine entrance into the labor market.9
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Denmark and contains yearly information on education, age, country of origin, parents’
education, etc. and weekly information about labor market status. Education attained
prior to immigration (relevant for the immigrant parents) comes from a survey-based
register and earnings data are obtained from the income tax registers deflated by the
consumer price index, using 2000 as its base year.10
We exclude from the data three groups of individuals. First, we exclude individuals,
who finish their education before 1996, because only children of guest workers from
mainly Turkey were living in Denmark before that time. Secondly, we exclude individ-
uals, who continue on to higher education immediately after high school and obtain a
higher degree, mainly because the observed period is not long enough to allow this
group of young individuals to find a job after a higher education. Lastly, we exclude
first-generation immigrants to ensure similar educational background and host country
language skills. The final data set consists of 404,527 graduates, 7,289 of which are
second-generation immigrants and 393,197 of which are ethnic Danes.4.1 Matching
In the sample analyzed, close to 2% of individuals are second-generation immigrants.
Table 1 shows matching variables relating to parental background by ethnicity and gen-
der (see notes to the table for column definitions). For each matching variable, we test
for equality in means between the immigrant sample and its matched native group
using a standard t-type test. The table shows that the fraction of fathers and mothers
with a middle-range or higher education is lower for those from non-Western coun-
tries. After matching, however, the test cannot reject that these values are equal across
the matched samples.
The employment rate for ethnic Danes is different for Western second-generation
mothers, and non-Western second-generation fathers and mothers. But when matched,
the parental employment rate in the ethnic Danish twin sample is at the same level as
that for immigrant parents. Finally, to find ethnic Danish twin counterparts, we have
also matched on individuals’ own age within gender groups, and on the year their first
spell starts.
Table 2 shows details for matching by network, which is the percentage of all individ-
uals that are employed in a person’s postal code area. The matching according to net-
work quality across ethnicity has been done in intervals of 5 percentage points in the
range 60%-85%. Before matching second-generation immigrants, especially of non-
Western ethnicity, are substantially less likely to live in areas with more than 85% em-
ployment, making it an important factor to match on. After matching, the differences
are evened-out in all instances, except for second-generation Western immigrants, who
are still observed to a greater extent to be living in areas with less than 60% employ-
ment (difference only weakly significant).
To show the effect of matching on the wage distribution, we include Figure 1, show-
ing the empirical distribution for males and females, respectively, before and after
matching. The upper and lower left-hand side graphs present the empirical CDFs of
wages from the first full-time job after graduation by ethnicity for females and males,
respectively. For both genders, the CDF for ethnic Danes lies to the right of the CDF’s
Table 1 Matching variables by ethnicity and gender
Females Males
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
All West Non-West West Non-West All West Non-West West Non-West
Age 21.27 21.00 19.54 20.94 19.51 20.72 20.52 19.39 20.69 19.34
Test 0.25 0.40 -0.85 0.78
FATHER:
High School 0.41 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.42 0.29 0.20 0.28 0.20
Test 0.28 -0.69 0.45 -0.09
Short-range 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03
Test -0.14 -0.31 0.40 -0.83
Middle-range 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.04
Test 0.19 -1.48 -0.94 -1.80
Long-range 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03
Test -0.55 -0.20 -0.32 -1.69
Employed 0.87 0.83 0.59 0.82 0.58 0.88 0.78 0.59 0.78 0.59
Test 0.40 0.75 0.14 0.03
MOTHER:
High School 0.33 0.31 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.12
Test 0.06 -0.09 0.38 -0.19
Short-range 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02
Test -1.57 0.10 -0.58 -1.27
Middle-range 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.04
Test -0.23 -0.62 0.08 -0.46
Long-range 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01
Test -0.99 -1.09 -2.36 -0.98
Employed 0.81 0.73 0.43 0.75 0.43 0.82 0.71 0.44 0.71 0.44
Test -0.55 -0.20 -0.06 0.18
Year dum. - Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The 3 groups for ethnic Danish females are All: all Ethnic Danes, West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-
generation Western females, Non-West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-generation non-Western females.
The 2 groups for 2nd-generation immigrants are West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in Western
countries and Non-West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in non-Western countries. Test: test for equality of
coefficient for ethnic Danish twins and their 2nd-generation comparable group. Source: Sample of young individuals,
1996-2003 (Statistics Denmark data).
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after matching, most of the wage difference disappears, however, second-generation non-
Western immigrants, in particular males, still have a lower wage. For second-generation
Western immigrants, on the other hand, the CDF is now to the right of that of the ethnic
Dane CDF for most of the distribution for females and in the lowest part for males.4.2 Education level
Table 3 shows that the educational distribution (divided into primary school, traditional
high school, business and technical high school, and vocational school11) varies signifi-
cantly over ethnicity. For instance 31 percentage points more second generation Non-
western male immigrants only have a primary school education and 26 percentage
Table 2 Matching variables by ethnicity and gender
Females Males
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
All West Non-West West Non-West All West Non-West West Non-West
Postal area employment rate:
<-60% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Test -1.34 -0.68 -1.91 0.23
60-65% 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04
Test 0.71 -0.98 -0.91 -2.06
65-70% 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05
Test 0.63 0.56 -0.66 -0.82
70-75% 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11
Test -0.35 -0.78 0.23 -0.08
75-80% 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28
Test 0.00 0.55 0.07 0.37
80-85% 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34
Test -0.18 0.31 0.18 0.61
85%-> 0.35 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.17
Test 0.28 -0.09 0.46 0.20
Note: The 3 groups for ethnic Danish females are All: all Ethnic Danes, West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-
generation Western females, Non-West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-generation non-Western females.
The 2 groups for 2nd-generation immigrants are West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in Western
countries and Non-West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in non-Western countries. Test: test for equality of
coefficient for ethnic Danish twins and their 2nd-generation comparable group. Source: Sample of young individuals,
1996-2003 (Statistics Denmark data).
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ences are similar for females, although females in both groups are more educated than
males. A lower share of females of all ethnicities has a vocational education, pointing to
gender differences in occupational preferences. Before matching, there are clearly large
differences between ethnic Danes and second-generation immigrants, for both genders.
After matching on parental characteristics, network variables, and individuals’ age and
gender, the difference is still significant for all groups of second-generation non-Figure 1 Comparison of empirical CDF over ethnicity.
Table 3 Education by ethnicity and gender
Females Males
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
All West Non-West West Non-West All West Non-West West Non-West
Primary school 0.20 0.23 0.47 0.22 0.44 0.26 0.32 0.56 0.30 0.57
Test 0.26 2.54 0.63 -0.82
High school, regular 0.37 0.40 0.24 0.44 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.32 0.17
Test -1.49 -2.24 -3.60 -5.61
Business & technical 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.10
Test -2.36 -5.06 -0.27 -5.42
Vocational educ. 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.42 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.16
Test 2.94 2.70 3.06 9.57
Note: The 3 groups for ethnic Danish females are All: all Ethnic Danes, West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-
generation Western females, Non-West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-generation non-Western females.
The 2 groups for 2nd-generation immigrants are West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in Western
countries and Non-West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in non-Western countries. Test: test for equality of
coefficient for ethnic Danish twins and their 2nd-generation comparable group. Source: Sample of young individuals,
1996-2003 (Statistics Denmark data).
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generation Western immigrants, only primary school completion for males and females
and business or technical high school completion for males is not significantly different
from that of the ethnic Danish twin. This finding is similar to what other studies in
Europe have found, i.e. that there is a positive selection of second-generation Western
immigrants. Because of these differences in educational attainment, we estimate separ-
ate search models for matched individuals given three educational levels—less than
high school, vocational education, and high school.4.3 Main variables in the ESM
Next we examine the means for the variables used in the equilibrium search model,
shown in Table 4. Overall, the analysis of means shows that labor market history seems
to play a smaller role for females than it does for males in terms of explaining the dif-
ferences in wages, as it is only for vocational education where ethnic Danes appear to
do better. A wage disadvantage for immigrant females does in general not exist as we
see that non-Western immigrant females appear to have the highest average yearly in-
come for primary school education and Western immigrants for vocational education.
However, these observations are based purely on means, and not on empirical analysis
such as through the ESM. A search model will help us in understanding if differences
in, for instance, spell length can explain the difference in wages across ethnicity.
For males, for all three groups yearly income is higher for ethnic Danes. When
examining the average spell length there seems to be a relation between the two for
individuals with only either primary school education or vocational education – this is
especially evident in terms of employment spells. However, since many of the differ-
ences are still present after matching, it indicates that more can be learned by estimat-
ing an ESM.
Table 4 Means for the main variables in the search model
Females Males
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
All West Non-West West Non-West All West Non-West West Non-West
Primary school 38611 124 1327 124 1327 51462 180 1769 180 1769
Duration, emp. 8.41 7.51 8.27 9.44 9.34 9.89 9.71 8.72 8.17 8.01
Test to all -1.09 -12.07 3.52 46.33
Test to matched -1.44 -7.83 1.49 7.44
Dur. unemp. 9.67 10.94 10.41 5.84 8.41 7.43 5.3 7.67 6.43 7.16
Test to all 4.3 4.44 1 1.75
Test to matched 1.05 3.44 -0.79 1.82
Yearly income 37006 33355 31685 31435 43378 53246 51579 45257 36006 45930
Test to all 0 0 0 0
Test to matched 0 0 0 0
High school 88884 306 1108 306 1108 63052 262 843 262 843
Duration, emp. 8.34 8.26 8.06 8.43 9.24 9.06 8.89 8.73 8.26 9.09
Test to all -0.37 -8.25 0.84 -0.38
Test to matched -0.31 -6.5 0.84 -1.41
Dur. unemp. 5.44 4.36 6.37 5.75 5.34 4.57 3.43 5.05 4.18 4.54
Test to all -0.29 1.11 -2.13 -5.88
Test to matched -0.98 4.1 -2.13 2.4
Yearly income 78488 75904 75467 76613 64914 87422 86081 81395 73678 78139
Test to all 0 0.01 0 0
Test to matched 0 0 0 0
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Table 4 Means for the main variables in the search model (Continued)
Vocational educ 68895 127 589 127 589 82293 152 500 152 500
Duration, emp. 14.5 13.18 11.64 13.72 10.99 12.71 13.2 11.45 13.34 9.64
Test to all 0.38 9.92 -0.04 1.95
Test to matched -0.12 0.91 -0.04 2.7
Dur. unemp. 4.54 5.75 4.63 4.14 5.79 3.21 3.5 4.35 4.26 5.21
Test to all 1.42 -7.37 -1.21 -3.3
Test to matched 1.53 -3.99 -1.21 -1.39
Yearly income 151681 149201 147114 156608 132160 189467 192604 184311 185585 156928
Test to all 0 0 0 0
Test to matched 0 0 0 0
Note: The 3 groups for ethnic Danish females are All: all Ethnic Danes, West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-generation Western females, Non-West: Ethnic Danish twins matched to the second-generation
non-Western females. The 2 groups for 2nd-generation immigrants are West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in Western countries and Non-West: second-generation immigrants with parents born in
non-Western countries. Test: test for equality of coefficient for ethnic Danish twins and their 2nd-generation comparable group. Source: Sample of young individuals, 1996-2003 (Statistics Denmark data).
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In the following sections, we examine ESM results for the different subgroups subdi-
vided into three education levels.12 An examination of the fit of the model to the data
aids in determining how well it explains the empirical CDFs. Figure 2 shows the empir-
ical and estimated CDFs of the wages from the first full-time job after graduation by
ethnicity for females and males before matching. For all six subsamples, the largest
part of the estimated CDF fits the empirical CDF very well. When the number of
homogenous firm groups (Q) is increased above five in the ESM, the model fits the
empirical distribution even in the tails but the conclusions remain the same, which is
why we only report the results for the ESM with five homogenous firm groups here.5.1 Heterogeneous ESM models
5.1.1. Comparison by gender
The estimation results of the heterogeneous ESM are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for
females and males respectively. Focusing on the level of the transition rates and com-
paring across gender, males receive more offers when unemployed, but they receive
slightly fewer offers when employed (except in the case of vocational education), and
they are laid off at a slightly lower rate than females. For both females and males, irrespect-
ive of ethnicity, jobs tend to lead to another job rather than to unemployment (λe < σ).
For each of the three parameters shown, we report a test of the equality of the coeffi-
cients for ethnic Danes in general compared to second-generation immigrants with
Western or non-Western ethnicity, respectively (designated test (to All) in the table).
We also report a test of equality of the coefficients between second-generation immi-
grants and their ethnic Danish twins (designated test (to ‘twins’) in the table). The
tables also report the P-values for a Wald-type test of the joint equality of all three
coefficients, which is calculated using the full covariance matrix. To interpret the par-
ameter estimates, note that for an unemployed ethnic Danish female (male) with a high
school degree, the probability of receiving and accepting an offer within three monthsFigure 2 Comparison of estimated (est) and empirical (emp) CDF.
Table 5 Heterogeneous ESM for females across education levels
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
High school All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 8888 306 1107 306 1107
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1851 0.1731 0.1277 0.1516 0.1486
When unemp. (λu) (0.0033) (0.0165) (0.0057) (0.0136) (0.0072)
Test (to ‘twins’) 1.0040 -2.2846
Test (to All) 2.3898 4.6304
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1349 0.1262 0.1338 0.1324 0.1144
When emp. (λe) (0.0015) (0.0078) (0.0045) (0.0082) (0.0039)
Test (to ‘twins’) -0.5481 3.2541
Test (to All) 0.3100 4.9029
Layoff rate 0.0473 0.0459 0.0494 0.0471 0.0470
When emp. (σ) (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0016)
Test (to ‘twins’) -0.3073 1.0369
Test (to All) 0.0443 0.1598
Average productivity 183.01 180.36 176.29 172.09 192.76
Joint Wald test statistic 1.59 17.97
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
Vocational All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 6890 127 589 127 589
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1396 0.1310 0.1282 0.1252 0.1029
When unemp. (λu) (0.0024) (0.0164) (0.0076) (0.0161) (0.0057)
Test (to ‘twins’) 0.2487 2.6580
Test (to All) 0.8817 5.8909
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.0581 0.0640 0.0729 0.0742 0.0761
When emp. (λe) (0.0009) (0.0079) (0.0040) (0.0081) (0.0045)
Test (to ‘twins’) -0.8994 -0.5243
Test (to All) -1.9714 -3.8970
Layoff rate 0.0403 0.0494 0.0481 0.0407 0.0553
When emp. (σ) (0.0005) (0.0047) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0025)
Test (to ‘twins’) 1.4195 -2.2042
Test (to All) -0.1125 -5.9531
Average productivity 240.11 235.69 234.61 218.95 242.26
Joint Wald test statistic 4.14 16.66
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
Primary shool All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 3861 124 1327 124 1327
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1040 0.1226 0.0847 0.1432 0.1189
When unemp. (λu) (0.0024) (0.0157) (0.0031) (0.0219) (0.0048)
Test (to ‘twins’) -0.7649 -5.9750
Test (to All) -1.7766 -2.7698
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.0952 0.1031 0.0996 0.0870 0.0848
When emp. (λe) (0.0019) (0.0114) (0.0038) (0.0097) (0.0030)
Test (to ‘twins’) 1.0768 3.0513
Test (to All) 0.8276 2.9204
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Table 5 Heterogeneous ESM for females across education levels (Continued)
Layoff rate 0.0510 0.0524 0.0588 0.0426 0.0499
When emp. (σ) (0.0009) (0.0054) (0.0019) (0.0046) (0.0015)
Test (to ‘twins’) 1.3929 3.6480
Test (to All) 1.8187 0.6272
Average productivity 170.52 140.71 175.95 133.86 179.84
Joint Wald test statistic 3.87 72.48
Note: see notes to Table 1. The number of homogenous firm groups is 5 in all estimations. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Test (to ‘twin’): t-type test for equality of coefficients of ethnic Danish twins and second-generation immigrants.
Test (to All): t-type test for equality of coefficients of ethnic Danes and second-generation immigrants. Joint Wald test statistic:
test for joint equality of all coefficients of Ethnic Danish twins and second-generation immigrants.
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unemployment.13 Likewise, the probability of receiving a new offer within 3 months of
employment is 21% (32%) for ethnic Danish females (males).14 Finally, the parameters
imply that the probability of being laid off for an ethnic Danish female (male) with a
high school degree is 13% (12%) within 3 months of employment.
5.1.2 Comparison across education and ethnicity, females
Comparing the arrival rate of jobs when unemployed for females entering the labor
market after finishing high school, both second-generation Western and non-Western
females receive fewer offers than ethnic Danes. Second-generation non-Western fe-
males have the lowest arrival rate, but not when one compares them to their ethnic
Danish twins, in which case it is reversed. For the arrival rates of jobs when employed,
though, high-school educated females with non-Western background have a lower
arrival rate than ethnic Danes have even when compared to their ethnic Danish twins.
However, all groups have similar layoff rates.
Second-generation Western females with a vocational education are again indistinguish-
able overall from their ethnic Danish twins, while second-generation non-Western fe-
males have a significantly lower arrival rate when unemployed than the other two groups
have. Yet, non-Western females have the highest arrival rate when employed, although
this is only significantly different from the arrival rates of ethnic natives.
Comparing the arrival rate of jobs when unemployed for females entering the labor
market after finishing primary school, both Western and non-Western females receive
more offers than ethnic Danes do, both in general and when compared with ethnic
Danish twins. Second-generation Western females have the highest arrival rate. For the
arrival rate of jobs when employed, however, ethnic Danish females have the highest
arrival rate. The same pattern is found for the layoff rate, meaning that ethnic Danes
are more likely to be laid off.5.1.3. Comparison across education and ethnicity, males
Table 6 shows similar results for males. For ethnic Danish males finishing high school,
the arrival rate of jobs when unemployed is not significantly different than that for
second-generation Western males although it is higher than that for second-generation
non-Western males. The arrival rate when employed is highest for second-generation
Western males, although their layoff rate is also the highest. In general, after matching,
second-generation males with a high school degree seem just as valuable to employers
Table 6 Heterogeneous ESM for males across education levels
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
High school All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 6305 262 834 262 834
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.2160 0.1703 0.1641 0.2190 0.1765
When unemp. (λu) (0.0049) (0.0179) (0.0091) (0.0224) (0.0099)
Test (to ‘twins’) -1.6983 -0.9185
Test (to All) -0.1291 3.5856
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1157 0.0978 0.1123 0.1294 0.1025
When emp. (λe) (0.0015) (0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0084) (0.0041)
Test (to ‘twins’) -2.9296 1.6388
Test (to All) -1.6026 3.0300
Layoff rate 0.0442 0.0411 0.0476 0.0512 0.0504
When emp. (σ) (0.0006) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0019)
Test (to ‘twins’) -2.3241 -1.0716
Test (to All) -2.0497 -3.1325
Average productivity 200.85 195.02 207.12 193.82 203.43
Joint Wald test stat 11.65 6.21
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
Vocational All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 8229 152 499 152 499
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.2084 0.1954 0.1950 0.1474 0.1282
When unemp. (λu) (0.0037) (0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0179) (0.0076)
Test (to ‘twins’) 1.5545 4.2775
Test (to All) 3.3381 9.4443
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.0787 0.0832 0.0847 0.0749 0.0863
When emp. (λe) (0.0010) (0.0079) (0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0054)
Test (to ‘twins’) 0.7613 -0.2298
Test (to All) 0.5022 -1.3861
Layoff rate 0.0386 0.0460 0.0407 0.0425 0.0619
When emp. (σ) (0.0004) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0030)
Test (to ‘twins’) 0.6593 -5.9415
Test (to All) -1.0668 -7.7600
Average productivity 245.77 254.32 239.68 244.19 249.74
Joint Wald test stat 2.84 71.99
Ethnic Danes 2nd-generation
Primary school All West Non-West West Non-West
Sample size 5146 180 1769 180 1769
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.1267 0.1126 0.1047 0.1391 0.1342
When unemp. (λu) (0.0028) (0.0130) (0.0035) (0.0152) (0.0047)
Test (to ‘twins’) -1.3189 -5.0626
Test (to All) -0.7969 -1.3743
Arrival rate of jobs, 0.0794 0.0758 0.0866 0.0731 0.0953
When emp. (λe) (0.0013) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0082) (0.0029)
Test (to ‘twins’) 0.2427 -2.1714
Test (to All) 0.7566 -4.9590
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Table 6 Heterogeneous ESM for males across education levels (Continued)
Layoff rate 0.0400 0.0435 0.0525 0.0613 0.0584
When emp. (σ) (0.0006) (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0054) (0.0015)
Test (to ‘twins’) -2.6936 -2.8121
Test (to All) -3.9043 -11.0291
Average productivity 166.5867 158.859 178.4932 193.0557 194.2319
Joint Wald test stat 9.14 28.92
See notes to Table 5.
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this type of educational background get more job offers.
For males with a vocational education, the pattern is the same as it is for those with a
high school education, but mostly with somewhat lower rates. The crucial differences,
as mentioned before, are a significantly lower offer arrival rate when unemployed and a
much higher layoff rate (1.5 times higher) for second-generation non-Western males.
In the group of males with a primary school education, 26% are ethnic Danes, 30%
are second-generation Western males, and an astonishing 57% are second-generation
non-Western males. As with females, second-generation males have a higher arrival
rate when unemployed than ethnic Danes and ethnic Danish twins. In contrast to
females, second-generation non-Western males have a higher arrival rate when
employed than ethnic Danes and ethnic Danish twins, but this does not hold for
second-generation Western males. The layoff rate is lowest for ethnic Danes
followed by the ethnic Danish twins and highest for second-generation Western
males, and the differences between both groups of male immigrants and the ethnic
Danes are significant.5.2 The importance of network in the analysis
In Denmark, especially in the largest cities, such as Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense, a
majority of immigrants are residentially segregated either through self-selection or be-
cause Danish immigrant housing policies, in place between 1986 and 1999, have placed
immigrants in the same areas. Immigrants placed in the same city sections by the gov-
ernment often ended up in areas with a high unemployment rate among ethnic Danes
(Damm (2009)). For this reason, we include the characteristics of the network in our
matching procedure. As a robustness check, however, we exclude the network variables
in the matching procedure and re-estimate the ESM for the different subsamples.
Having estimated the models, we test the hypothesis that network has a significant
effect, and find because of the small samples and, hence, large standard errors, the hy-
pothesis is most often rejected. However, if we examine the rates with and without net-
work in the matching procedure, the differences are relatively large. For males, in most
cases, network has a negative effect on the arrival rate of jobs, both while being un-
employed and employed, meaning that the likelihood of finding a job is lower when
you match on network. For females ethnic Danish twin network mostly affects those
with a vocational education. For these workers, matching on network has a negative
effect while they are unemployed. Comparing across ethnicity, the results are very clear
when including network in the matching analysis. In particular, the arrival rate of jobs
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employment rate has negative effects.156 Conclusion
Second-generation immigrants are typically observed to have limited labor market success
compared to ethnic natives in high wage, high labor cost regimes. A widely discussed
question is whether firms behave differently toward second-generation immigrants enter-
ing the labor market in these countries in terms of hiring and firing decisions.
Our study is one of the first to take search friction and cross-firm differences in
factor productivity into account when investigating firm behavior towards second-
generation immigrants. Because the background of second-generation immigrants
might differ from those of ethnic Danes, even though all have been raised in Denmark,
we use the matching method to control for socioeconomic circumstances.
Before matching, there is a big difference between the parental characteristics of
second-generation immigrants and ethnic Danes, but after matching most of these dif-
ferences disappear. Regarding networks, on average ethnic Danes tend to live in areas
with higher average employment than second-generation immigrants do. However, here
too, the differences even out after matching. Based on the descriptive analysis of the
data, we make some important observations. First, the employment rate is lower for
second-generation immigrants for both males and females, independent of their par-
ents’ country of origin. Furthermore, a considerably lower share of second-generation
immigrants have vocational education compared to that of ethnic Danes, while a con-
siderably higher share of second-generation immigrants have primary school education
only compared to that of ethnic Danes.
Finally, from the search model, we uncover several key results. First of all, the esti-
mated wage offer distribution which is the key ingredient of the equilibrium search
model fits rather well the empirical distribution for all sub-groups confirming the pre-
dictive power of the approach. Our study shows that the differences in transition rates
across ethnicity and education for females are small after matching, so that second-
generation females, both of Western and non-Western origin, do as well or even better
compared to their ethnic Danish twins. For second generation non-Western females
the results after matching are a bit mixed, though firms seem to prefer hiring and
retaining the high-school and primary-school educated non-Western females over their
ethnic Danish twins but they also receive fewer offers as employed. Second generation
non-Western females face difficulties getting a vocational education, and the few who
do seem to experience trouble getting into the labor market after completing their edu-
cation, perhaps due to the existence of hiring discrimination. However, once they man-
age to get a job, they get as many offers as ethnic Danes get, although they still tend to
be laid off at a higher rate.
For males, matching makes a bigger difference to the results. Second-generation
males with high-school or primary school education have a higher arrival rate of jobs
both while unemployed and employed compared to that of their ethnic Danish twins,
but have more trouble keeping their jobs. For the new male entrants with vocational
education ethnic Danes perform significantly better than second generation immigrants
do in terms of higher arrival rates when unemployed and lower layoff rates. Thus, even
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tion seem not to be able to make the right contacts early on in the vocational education
program, i.e. getting the right apprenticeships or internships. At the same time, they
have higher average productivity parameters than do their ethnic Danish twins and
second-generation Western males. This tends to discredit the job volatility/unmeasured
skill explanation of higher layoff rates of second-generation non-Western males, and
points instead to the existence of other, possibly preference-based explanations i.e.
discrimination.
A positive finding from our study is that employers in Denmark seem to have reacted
to recent labor market initiatives to enhance integration by hiring qualified new en-
trants from the immigrant community, especially second-generation immigrants with a
high school degree whose arrival rates out of unemployment and layoff rates are not
substantially different from those of their ethnic Danish twins. Policymakers now need
to give Danish employers offering jobs requiring vocational qualifications greater incen-
tives to hire and retain young second-generation immigrants, in particular males of
non-Western origin, as our results indicate that this group faces possible discrimination
related to both hiring and layoff.Endnotes
1Second-generation immigrants: Individuals born in Denmark with both parents born
outside Denmark. Ethnic Danes: Individuals with Danish-born parent(s).
2Observationally equivalent ethnic Danes (labeled Ethnic Danish ‘twin’): An ethnic
Dane with similar background characteristics as a second-generation immigrant, found
by using matching (see Section 4.2).
3In Denmark, the second generation is still rather young: 75% were under age 15 in
2006 (Leibig (2007)).
4The search model has also been used to discuss race wage differentials in the US
(see Bowlus and Seitz (2000) and Bowlus et al. (2001)).
5For simplicity of exposition, workers and employers are assumed not to discount the
future (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998)).
6Several papers have shown that the inconsistency between the empirical and theoret-
ical wage distributions can be reconciled if firms are heterogeneous in productivity. We
follow Bowlus et al. (1995) where heterogeneity can be viewed as arising from a finite
number of firm types i.e. a discrete distribution.
7Western second-generation immigrants: Children of immigrants from Western
countries. The definition of Western and non-Western countries is taken from Statistic
Denmark’s homepage: http://www.dst.dk/Vejviser/dokumentation/hvadbetyder.aspx?
keyword=vestligelande. Western countries include EU, Andorra, Australia, Canada,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, USA
and the Vatican. All other countries are considered non-Western. In earlier work, we
have estimated the ESM model for the non-Western second-generation group separ-
ately by Asian and African ethnicity (available on request).
8We include these parents in the basic group containing individuals with a primary
education or lower. If information on the parents’ employment status is missing, which
happens for 3% of parents, the dummy variable takes the value zero (i.e. not employed).
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from Denmark. We could have deleted the individuals for whom parental information
is missing. However, since we only use this information for matching purposes, we
retain them, rather than introduce potential non-randomness.
9Primary school, vocational school or high-school degrees make up nearly 60% of the
highest educational degree obtained by age 30 in 2012 in Denmark (Statistics Denmark).
10The wage information reported needs to be handled with care: Some individuals
have an hourly wage rate outside the acceptable range, which is set between 30 and 300
DKK—1% of the wages are above and 3% are below. About 4% of the wages are miss-
ing. These cases have been deleted from the sample. To check that this does not affect
our results, we used regression imputation for the 8% of the observations using yearly
wage, ethnicity, education and employment. Using the full sample does not change any
of the results notably.
11If an individual holds a high school degree and has also taken vocational education,
the one obtained last is reported here.
12OLS estimates of the wage and employment equations show that for second-
generation Western males, their wages would, in fact, exceed those of ethnic Danes by
1.7% if they had the same parental background, neighborhood conditions and educa-
tional profile as ethnic Danes. For the three other ethnic groups, there is still a negative
penalty of 2.3% to 8.2%. These wage differences are economically significant in a
welfare-state country such as Denmark where the income distribution tends to be rela-
tively more compressed. Furthermore, if lower starting wages feedback into a lowered
work effort or a shorter career, large differences in lifetime income can result. In terms
of the probability of obtaining employment, second-generation immigrants have a 2.7%
to 5.6% lower likelihood.
13These probabilities are calculated as F (t) =1 − exp(−λut).
14These probabilities are calculated as F (t) = 1 − exp(−het), where he tð Þ ¼ σ þ λeð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
P−w
P−r
q	 

−σ.
15Results available on request.
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